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RAMSEY FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY UNDER STICKY PRICES AND
LIQUID BONDS
BY YIFAN HU AND TIMOTHY KAM∗
ABSTRACT. We construct a monetary model where government bonds also provide liquidity service.
Liquid government bonds create an endogenous interest-rate spread, affect equilibrium allocations
and inﬂation by altering the Ramsey planner’s sequence of implementability and sticky-price con-
straints. The trade-off confronting a planner in a sticky-price world, shown in recent literature,
between using inﬂation surprise and labor-income tax is modiﬁed by the existence of the liquid
bond. We ﬁnd that the more sticky prices become, the more the planner stabilizes prices and also
creates less distortionary and less volatile income taxes by taxing the liquidity service of bonds in
order to replicate ex post real state-contingent debt.
KEYWORDS: Optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy; sticky prices; liquid bonds.
J.E.L. CODE: E42; E52; E63
1. INTRODUCTION
T
HERE HAS BEEN recent renewed interest in the issue of optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy.
The benchmark framework approaches this issue from the point of view of a Ramsey planner.
However recent focus has been on model economies where inﬂation matters and is costly to society
in real terms. In this paper we provide an alternative setup of a sticky-price dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model with Ramsey optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy whereby there can exist
an interest rate spread between two classes of nominally risk free bonds (government and private
bonds) ` a la Canzoneri and Diba (2005). The crucial difference between the bonds here is that
government bonds provide some liquidity service. Thus private agents may want to hold assets in
the form of government debt in exchange for their liquidity service although they pay a lower return
than the private bond. Canzoneri and Diba (2005) provide the factual example that, “ ... [U].S.
Treasury bills clearly facilitate transactions in a number of ways: they serve as collateral in many
ﬁnancial markets, banks hold them to manage the liquidity of their portfolios, and individuals hold
them in money-market accounts that offer checking services.” We investigate how this new feature
alters the equilibrium characterization of the Ramsey allocation, and modiﬁes the trade-off between
price stability and income-tax stability found in recent papers, such as Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe
(2004a) and Siu (2004), on Ramsey optimal policy in sticky price environments.
We show that government debt dynamics affect the intertemporal allocations of resources via the
Ramsey planner’s sequence of implementability constraints. This does not happen in standard models
where government debt provides no liquidity service. In our model, government debt modiﬁes the
∗Corresponding author: TIMOTHY KAM, Email: timothy.kam@anu.edu.au
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marginal utility value of future streams of budget surpluses and also directly via the money-bond
transactions technology constraint, in the sequence of implementability constraints. This is because
government bonds are valued by the private sector in terms of their transactions service, and this is
taken into account by the planner in designing an optimal plan for its ﬁscal and monetary policy.
The existence of liquid, interest-bearing government bonds creates a spread between the returns on
illiquid private bonds and liquid government bonds that acts as an additional tax instrument.1 This
suggests an avenue for ﬁscal policy, in terms of government debt with liquidity services (via the
interest-rate spread), to alter the trade-offs between a limited number of distorting tax instruments
faced by a Ramsey planner who wishes to approximate market completion in a world without real
state-contingent assets.
We ﬁnd that the more sticky prices become, the more the optimal Ramsey plan favors price
stability but the planner can also afford a less distortionary and less volatile income tax scheme. The
latter result is opposite to that of existing literature, for example Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004a)
and Siu (2004). This is because in our model the dynamics of liquid government bonds affect the
government’s sequence of implementability (intertemporal solvency) constraints. Thus the planner
uses the interest-spread channel which alters the dynamics of liquid government bonds, as a means
of satisfying the constraints, in designing its optimal tax and monetary policy plan. In doing so, the
planner does not have to rely so much on using distortionary income tax or costly inﬂation to meet
its expected intertemporal solvency constraints.
In earlier literature on optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy, the analyses were often carried out using
competitive ﬂexible-price monetary models without capital, for example, Lucas and Stokey (1983),
Calvo and Guidotti (1993), and Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1991). The general conclusion was
that optimal ﬁscal-monetary policy entails a volatile and serially uncorrelated inﬂation rate while
labor income tax is smooth. This is because the planner uses surprise inﬂation as a lump-sum tax
on household ﬁnancial wealth, while minimizing the distortionary effect of labor income tax. Thus
real government bonds act as a shock absorber to maintain a constant path for the labor income tax
rate.
In the seminal works of Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004a) and Siu (2004), the authors provide a
variation on the results found in the optimal ﬁscal-monetary policy literature. In such economies,
inﬂation is costly in terms of real resources such that the planner has to trade-off between minimizing
tax distortions and minimizing costly inﬂation volatility. On one hand, in order to minimize tax
distortions on private work incentives, the planner would like to use unexpected variations in the
price level as a means for taxing household wealth, which leads to greater inﬂation volatility. This
is the same effect found in the earlier class of ﬂexible price competitive economies. On the other,
the existence of price-adjustment cost affects household welfare via their feasibility constraint. This
discourages the planner from trading off unexpected inﬂation with labor income tax variations,
resulting in lower inﬂation volatility. Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004a) ﬁnd that the second effect
1 One can envision that the private sector can also issue liquid assets or bonds (e.g. credit cards, commercial paper and
etc.). However, for the sake of clarity and exposition, we assume that there only exist a nominally risk-free private bond
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dominates. In other words, for modest degrees of price stickiness, the tension is resolved in the
direction in favor of price stability or low inﬂation volatility. Furthermore, the tax rate on labor
is still reasonably smooth or “near random walk”, but this tends to be less so, when there is
imperfect competition; or even less when there exist sticky prices. Siu (2004) also has very similar
conclusions. Siu (2004) speciﬁcally reports that under an optimal Ramsey policy, the volatility of
inﬂation decreases while that of the labor tax rate increases as the degree of price stickiness in the
economy rises. He also ﬁnds that the tax distortion can be smoothed over time.2
The new addition in our model has a close counterpart in Canzoneri and Diba (2005). However, they
were concerned with the issue of price level determinacy in a deterministic, partial-equilibrium and
ﬂexible-price model with simple monetary- and ﬁscal-policy rules. In their economy, ﬁscal policy
can provide a nominal anchor, even when monetary policy does not. Their result arises because
government bonds can provide liquidity services and this allows bonds to affect the equilibrium
process for inﬂation. They allow for bonds to enter a cash-in-advanced (CIA) constraint and to
act as imperfect substitutes for money. We generalize their assumption to a general equilibrium
production economy with costly price adjustment. Furthermore, we consider optimal policy from the
point of view of the benchmark Ramsey planner.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We outline the model primitives in Section
2. We show how a decentralized equilibrium, deﬁned in Section 3, can be supported as a Ramsey
planning problem in Section 4. We then deduce the implications of the introduced liquid-bond feature
in the model for Ramsey optimal taxation and monetary policy, in Section 5. We calibrate the model
and perform some numerical experiments to study the behavior of the Ramsey equilibria in Section
6. We conclude in Section 7.
2. THE MODEL
Consider an economy populated by a continuum of inﬁnitely lived identical households on [0,1].
Each period t ∈ N, household derives utility from consumption, ct, and leisure, 1 − ht where time
endowment is unity and ht is the fraction of time spent working. Households are also monopolistic
ﬁrms producing differentiated intermediate goods. Fiscal and monetary policy will be determined
jointly by a Ramsey planner. We begin by specifying the exogenous stochastic processes in the
model.
2.1 Exogenous stochastic processes
There are two exogenous forcing processes in the model. These can be interpreted as demand and
supply shocks. On the demand side, government spending is a Markov process, where






2The result in Siu (2004) and Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004a), in terms of a near-unit-root feature of optimal income
tax, echoes the outcome in Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent, and Sepp¨ al¨ a (2002). In Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent, and Sepp¨ al¨ a
(2002), the model is perfectly competitive but features incomplete markets where there is only real non-state-contingent
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where g is steady state government consumption. On the supply side, economy-wide shocks to
production technology is given by the Markov process






It is assumed that (g t,zt)
0 ∈ S where S ⊂ R2
+ is compact.
2.2 Household-ﬁrm problem
Households are monopolistic ﬁrms producing a differentiated intermediate good. Deﬁne Yt as
the total ﬁnal demand for aggregate output, e Pt as the ﬁrm-speciﬁc price charged by each ﬁrm,









< 0, d(1) = 1, and d0 (1) < −1. The household-ﬁrm employs labor, e ht, with a






Yt = zte ht (3)
Because each household-ﬁrm is monopolistic, it can set e Pt, and following Rotemberg (1982), we















where θ will be a parameter governing the degree of price-stickiness and Π ≥ 1 is steady-state
inﬂation.
Let mt = Mt/Pt and bt = Bt/Pt ∈ B ⊂ R+ respectively denote real money balances and real
government bond holdings determined at the end of period t. Deﬁne Πt = Pt/Pt−1 and pt = e Pt/Pt
respectively, as gross inﬂation and a ﬁrm-speciﬁc price relative to the average price level. Let Rt
be the one-period nominally risk-free gross return on government bond holdings, b∗
t ∈ B∗ ⊂ R be a
private bond that pays a nominally risk-free return of R∗
t in period t + 1, and τt ∈ [0,1] be the ﬂat
tax rate on labor income. The sequence of household budget constraints is given by






















+ (1 − τt)wtht. (5)





where E0 is the mathematical expectations operator, taken over the sequence of functions U (ct,ht)
measurable with respect to the information set generated by {zt,gt,b∗
t,bt} at time 0.3 U (·) satisﬁes
3Speciﬁcally at time zero, the information set or sigma algebra is F0 = B0 × B
∗
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the Inada conditions: limc&0 Uc (c,h) = +∞ and liml&0 Ul (c,h) = +∞ where l := 1 − h. The
household maximizes (6) subject to (5) and a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint:
mt + k(bt) ≥ ct. (7)
The transactions service of bonds is reﬂected in the function k(bt) which satisﬁes the following
properties, which are similar to Canzoneri and Diba (2005) except for a minor modiﬁcation to allow
for endogenous output determination in our model.
ASSUMPTION 1: The function k(bt) satisﬁes:
A1 k(bt) = 0 for bt ≤ 0;
A2 k0 (bt) > 0 and k00 (bt) < 0 for bt > 0;
A3 limb&0 k0 (bt) < 1, limb%+∞ k0 (bt) = 0 and limb%+∞ k(bt) < ct.
Assumption A1 ensures that negative bond holdings do not provide any transactions value so that
bt ∈ B ⊂ R+, and A2 ensures that positive government bond holdings provide increasing transactions
service, but the marginal transactions service is decreasing. Lastly, A3 ensures that these bonds are
never sufﬁcient to fund all consumption purchases.4 That is, there will still be positive holdings of
money.5
Let the Lagrange multiplier on the constraints (7) and (5) be µt and λt, respectively, and the
multiplier on the technology constraint (3), when inserted into (5) be mctλt, where mct is the real
marginal cost of production for a ﬁrm. The ﬁrst-order conditions are
ct : Uc (ct,ht) = λt + µt (9)
b∗












+ µtk0 (bt) (11)






4 In terms of practical implementation, to ensure the CIA binds at all times and still satisﬁes positive money holdings,
we will assume shocks with small bounded supports, and admit only the parameter limb%+∞ k (bt) = φ such that for
sufﬁciently large steady-state consumption, c > φ, consumption ct will almost surely be bounded above k (bt) for all t
and all histories leading up to and including date t.
5 Alternatively we could have modeled the CIA constraint as
mt + k (bt)ct ≥ ct. (8)
where k still satisﬁes Assumption 1. This would be closer to the CIA constraint in the endowment economy of Canzoneri
and Diba (2005), where ct = y = 1. In this case, mt will be strictly positive since ct is nonnegative under the Inada
conditions, and k (bt) ∈ (0,1). However, this assumption creates additional nonlinearities in the optimality conditions with
respect to liquid bonds for households and the planner, without affording much difference in the qualitative implications
of the model.6 ANU WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS NO. 472
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for all states and dates t ∈ N. The last two conditions (14) and (15), respectively, characterize the
optimal labor demand by the household-ﬁrm and the optimal price-setting condition which depends
on expected future prices. These ﬁrst-order conditions are quite standard, apart from (11).
2.3 Symmetric pricing equilibrium
In equilibrium, there is no trade of the private bond. However it can be shown that the interest
rate on the private bond must still be positive in equilibrium.
LEMMA 1: In equilibrium b∗
t = 0 but R∗
t > 1.
Proof: Identical households have no desire to borrow or lend to each other on the private asset
market so that b∗









for all states and dates t ∈ N. By the Inada condition on consumption, it must be that ct > 0, and
along with Assumption 1, the CIA constraint must bind so that µt > 0, and with optimality such
that λt > 0, for all states and dates t ∈ N, then (16) implies that R∗
t > 1 for all states and dates
t ∈ N.
Also, in a symmetric equilibrium, all household-ﬁrms charge the same price, so that pt = 1. That
is, all households will charge the same price as the average price, or e Pt = Pt, for all t. Given the same
production technology and competitive wage rate, it must be that the amount of labor supplied by each
household equals its demand in its production such that ht = e ht. The demand for each monopolist’s
good is d(pt)Yt so that the elasticity of demand for each good is (pt) = d0 (pt)ptYt/d(pt)Yt.
In a symmetric equilibrium, pt = 1 so that under our assumption that d(1) = 1, we get the
elasticity of demand faced by each household-ﬁrm is constant, η ≡ d0 (1) < −1. Since the marginal
revenue for each monopolist is [1 + (pt)]d(pt)Yt, in the symmetric equilibrium, marginal revenue
for all monopolists becomes (1 + η)Yt. The optimal pricing condition (15), together with the fact
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after taking conditional expectations. This is an expectations-augmented Phillips curve, which says
that time-t inﬂation depends on the contemporaneous gap between real marginal cost and steady-state
real marginal cost, η−1 (1 + η), and expected discounted next-period inﬂation. Also, the greater is the
cost of prices adjustment, θ → ∞, the closer is expected discounted next-period inﬂation to current
inﬂation. That is, prices are expected not to change very much the more costly is price adjustment.
The greater is the elasticity of demand, η → −∞, the more positive and sensitive is the response of
current inﬂation to real marginal cost (limiting case of perfect competition).
2.4 Resource constraint
The resource constraint is given by






which is the market clearing condition for consumption goods, private and government, where some
of that produced resources is dissipated in terms of a price-adjustment cost.
2.5 Government budget constraint
The sequence of government budget constraints is
Mt + Bt + τtPtwtht = Mt−1 + Rt−1Bt−1 + Ptgt. (19)
This says that government spending and the payment of public debt with interest, is ﬁnanced with
either the issue of new money, new debt or income tax receipts. We can re-write this in real terms
as







for t ∈ N. Notice that with higher inﬂation, the government can relax the one-period government
budget constraint by lowering the real liability of money holding mt−1/Πt. This also makes the real
gross return on government bonds, Rt−1/Πt, depend on the state of inﬂation.
3. DECENTRALIZED EQUILIBRIUM
The following deﬁnes the competitive or decentralized equilibrium for a given feasible policy rule.
DEFINITION 1: Given policy rule {τt,Rt,R∗
t}
∞
t=0, a decentralized equilibrium is the sequence of
bounded allocations {ct,ht,mt,wt,Πt,mct,bt}
∞
t=0 respecting the optimality conditions (9)-(14) and










(Rt+sBt+s + Mt+s) = 0, (21)
for given stochastic processes (1)-(2).8 ANU WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS NO. 472
4. RAMSEY PROBLEM
We cast the ﬁscal and monetary policy problem in terms of a Ramsey planning problem which
implements a decentralized equilibrium. First we characterize the equilibrium using the primal
approach as in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), Lucas and Stokey (1983), and Chari, Christiano, and
Kehoe (1995), which characterizes the equilibrium in terms of allocations (and the inﬂation rate)
as far as possible. This is done so that we can show, in a condensed way, how the introduction of
liquid government bonds, bt, can alter the Ramsey equilibrium allocations. In order to analyze the
qualitative behavior of these dynamics, we will characterize and solve the Ramsey problem using
the dual approach, as set out in Appendix B.
The following proposition shows that the equilibrium plan under such a Ramsey planner also
satisﬁes the condition of a decentralized equilibrium in Deﬁnition 1.
PROPOSITION 1: The plans {ct,ht,Πt,mct,bt,R∗
t}
∞
t=0 respecting the resource constraint (18), the
sequence of government budget constraints:



























for t ≥ 1 and
























































































































, for all states and t = 0,1,2,..., and given
initial conditions (R−1B−1 + M−1)/P−1 also satisfy the decentralized equilibrium in Deﬁnition 1.
Proof: See Appendix A.
REMARK 1: The LHS of (24) is the expected present value of the stochastic stream of utility
value of the government’s real budget surpluses, which takes into account private agents’ optimal
plans given the government’s strategy. However, this is augmented by: (a) monopolistic competitiveHU & KAM: RAMSEY POLICY UNDER STICKY PRICES AND LIQUID BONDS 9
distortions; and (b) private demand for liquidity, which would reduce to similar implementability
contraints for ﬂexible-price economies if mct+s = 0,∀t,s ≥ 0. The RHS is the utility value of
existing government budget deﬁcit at the beginning of time t ≥ 0.
REMARK 2: Note that {bt+s}∞
s=0 appears in the implementability constraint (24). This is not the
case in the one-bond and one-interest-rate models typically found in the literature. For instance,
compare this with equation (29) of Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004a). Thus we have an additional
channel, in the dynamics of liquid government bonds, via which ﬁscal policy can alter the constraints
faced by the planner. We defer further discussion of this to Section 5.
REMARK 3: The existence of costly price adjustment implies that the Ramsey plan underlying
the primal form of the decentralized equilibrium can no longer be described by a single sequence
of present-value implementability constraint as is usually done in ﬂexible-price economies. There is
also a sequence of sticky-price constraints facing the planner, which is summarized by (23).
The intuition from Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004a) is that the sequence of prices is uniquely
determined when real allocations are obtained in the primal form of a ﬂexible price equilibrium.
These prices then imply a sequence of real discount factors that ensure the transversality condition
in the competitive equilibrium is respected in all dates and states. However, when a Phillips curve
exists under sticky prices, it imposes an additional constraint on the across-state and across-date
feasibility of allocations. So in order for the resulting Ramsey plan to deliver a sequence of prices
that is consistent with that in a decentralize equilibrium, the plan has to satisfy both the decentral-
ized equilibrium’s transversality condition and the Phillips curve constraints, and the sequence of
implementability constraints.6
In our model, the planner can use the additional liquid-bond interest-rate instrument to alleviate
some of the constraints imposed by sticky-prices on the implementability constraints. This alters
some of the trade-off between price stability and across-state and across-time labor tax smoothing
result found by Siu (2004) and Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004a). While it is not possible to show
analytically how liquid government bonds alleviate these constraints in the model, we can show these
results numerically in Section 6. Nevertheless, we can deduce and discuss the implications of the
liquid government bond for Ramsey equilibrium allocations in the next section.
5. LIQUID-BOND IMPLICATIONS FOR OPTIMAL POLICY
Government policy can be pinned down as a sequence {R∗
t,Rt,τt}∞
t=0, where the ﬁrst interest rate
can be thought as monetary policy pinning down the pricing kernel with respect to the private bond,
b∗
t, which then pins down optimal private consumption in the Euler equation (10).
Given {R∗
t}∞
t=0, combining the marginal utility of consumption (9) and (10), real money demand












6Siu (2004) showed that sticky prices effectively impose a cost on the planner in using inﬂation as means of making ex
post real debt state-contingent and that this outcome would approximately be equivalent to a real economy that rules out
real state-contingent bond markets as in Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent, and Sepp¨ al¨ a (2002).10 ANU WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS NO. 472
so that the planner determines the consumption-leisure margin by setting income tax policy {τt}∞
t=0
for given real wage rate wt. Equation (25) is the usual consumption-leisure intratemporal condition
with the qualiﬁcation that with money demand through the CIA constraint, the opportunity cost of
money, R∗
t affects the marginal utility of consumption via the marginal cost of liquidity holding, µt.
Consider now the policy instrument Rt. Combining (10)-(12), we can express the optimal demand







At the optimum, the household will demand government bonds up to the point where the marginal
transactions value of such bonds are equal to the marginal opportunity cost of holding government
bonds, relative to the private bond which pays a return of R∗
t. Notice that as long as bt > 0 it must be
that, R∗
t −Rt > 0 since k0 (bt) > 0. Thus, as long as the government issues bonds with transactions
value for private agents, there will exist an interest-rate spread in the model.7
A consequence of liquid bond demand is that real money demand is now affected by the process
of government bonds, bt, directly. This can be seen by combining the CIA constraint (7), when it
binds, with (9) to yield real money demand as mt = U−1
c (λt + µt)−k(bt) and λt and µt are pinned
down by (10)-(12) which explicitly involve the demand for government bonds k0 (bt). Hence, there
is an intratemporal effect of the policy spread R∗
t −Rt that determines the distribution of household
liquidity holdings between money and government bonds.
Finally, government bonds affect optimal inﬂation dynamics (15) through the real marginal cost of
production, mct, and this comes directly from its immediate effect on the marginal value of wealth
λt in (11) and hence optimal labor supply and demand, (13) and (14). This has an indirect effect on
the Phillips curve constraint for the planner (23).
Thus, the existence of liquid bt allows the planner to exploit the spread, R∗
t − Rt, and therefore
the path of bt in order to satisfy its sequence of implementability constraints in (24) and sticky-price
constraints (23) in return for smoothing labor income tax across states and dates and also maintaining
stability in costly inﬂation, under the Ramsey optimal plan.
To gain further insight into the role of liquid government bonds and the effect of the interest-rate
spread in affecting the optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy, we use numerical solutions and simulations
in the next section.
6. PROPERTIES OF RAMSEY EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we present numerical solutions and examples of the Ramsey equilibrium. First, we
consider how the optimal Ramsey program behaves in environments with and without sticky prices
7 There are many empirical studies, notably Weil (1989), Giovannini and Labadie (1991) , Bansal and Coleman (1996),
and Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2002), that ﬁnd a sizeable equity premium, or a large spread between the average return
on equity and the return on treasury bills. In our model, care has to be taken to interpret the interest-rate spread literally
as an “equity premium”. As Canzoneri and Diba (2005) suggest, one might attempt to measure our return on the illiquid
private bond, R
∗ , using consumption and price data on our household’s Euler equation. Further, one can take the return
on liquid government bonds, R, as that for a three-month T-bill. In that instance, our notion of an interest-rate spread,
R
∗ − R, should have a magnitude that is close to what is observed as the equity premium.HU & KAM: RAMSEY POLICY UNDER STICKY PRICES AND LIQUID BONDS 11
and/or liquid bonds, using a baseline calibration. Second, we examine the behavior of the Ramsey
plan within successively more sticky price environments, when we allow for liquid government
bonds. Third, we investigate further the role that bond liquidity plays, by repeating the previous
experiment across different degrees of bond liquidity. Last, we consider the role played by bond
liquidity in the face of technology or government spending shocks individually, using the baseline
sticky-price calibration.
In order to implement the model numerically, we impose functional forms on the model’s primi-
tives. We assume the period utility of the representative household to be U (c,h) = lnc+δ ln(1 − h).







φ ≤ c and c is steady-state consumption. This functional form is similar to that used by Canzoneri
and Diba (2005) in their numerical example.
TABLE 1
BASELINE FULL MODEL (SP) CALIBRATION
Parameter Value Description
β 0.956 Subjective discount factor
sg 0.2 Share of government consumption in GDP
Π 1.042 Gross inﬂation rate
z 1 Steady-state level of technology
δ 3.017 Labor supply parameter
φ 0.149 Bond substitutability parameter
b/zh 0.44 Share of government debt in GDP
θ 17.5/4 Degree of price stickiness
η −6 Elasticity of demand
ρz 0.82 Autocorrelation of technology
σz 0.0229 Std. deviation of technology shock
ρg 0.9 Autocorrelation of government spending
σg 0.0302 Std. deviation of government spending shock
The baseline sticky-price-liquid-bond economy (denoted later as SP) is calibrated using post-war
US data. The calibration is summarized in Table 1. The calibration of β, given steady-state inﬂation
Π = 1.042, ensures that steady-state nominal return on the private bond is R∗ = 1.09. Given the
share of government debt in GDP of about 44 per cent per annum, we can calibrate φ to ensure
that the interest rate spread, R∗ − R in steady state is about 5 percent, following the ﬁndings of
Bansal and Coleman (1996). The parameter δ is solved endogenously using the government budget
constraint at steady state, and is consistent with a fraction of hours worked, h = 0.2. The details of
calibrating φ and δ can be found in Appendix C. The rest of the parameters follow the calibration
of Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004a). We employ a second-order accurate perturbation method by
Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004b) to solve for the optimal state transition and policy functions around
the non-stochastic steady-state.12 ANU WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS NO. 472
TABLE 2
TAX RATE PROPERTIES OF VARIOUS ECONOMIES
Economies R∗ R Π τ
Unconditional mean
FP* (φ = θ = 0) 1.014 – 0.969 0.427
SP* (φ = 0) 1.090 – 1.040 0.341
FP (θ = 0) 1.063 1.000 1.017 0.390
SP 1.090 1.018 1.042 0.370
Percentage standard deviation
FP* (φ = θ = 0) 0.532 – 0.532 0.893
SP* (φ = 0) 0.009 – 0.007 0.160
FP (θ = 0) 0.113 0.069 0.119 0.229
SP 0.005 0.037 0.001 0.091
Autocorrelation
FP* (φ = θ = 0) 0.960 – 0.963 0.891
SP* (φ = 0) 0.783 – 0.997 0.929
FP (θ = 0) 0.908 0.916 0.759 0.153
SP 0.684 0.958 0.181 0.777
Notes:
1. Where unstated, θ = 17.5/4 and φ = 0.149.
2. Statistics of H = 500 simulations of length T = 100.
3. The ﬁrst 500 periods of time series were discarded.
6.1 Equilibrium Comparisons
We will focus on comparing alternative model settings and assessing the models’ qualitative tax
properties using the baseline calibration in Table 1, unless otherwise stated. This exercise is reported
in Table 2. The four settings we consider here are:
• Model FP*: Flexible prices, θ = 0, where government bonds are not liquid, φ = 0.
• Model SP*: Sticky prices, θ = 17.5/4, where government bonds are not liquid, φ = 0.
• Model FP: Flexible prices, θ = 0, and government bonds provide liquidity, φ = 0.149.
• Model SP: Sticky prices, θ = 17.5/4, and government bonds provide liquidity, φ = 0.149.
We do not report the case where there are ﬂexible prices and perfectly competitive markets since
the results are well known in the literature, as summarized by Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1991).
Furthermore, we wish to focus on the role of liquid bonds and its implications for optimal policy in
more recent model economies with non-competitive markets.
Steady state tax properties: Consider the steady-state or unconditional mean properties reported
in Table 2. When government bonds do not provide liquidity (FP* and SP*), φ = 0, the instrument
Rt becomes redundant. This is obvious from the identical stochastic discount factor in (10) and (11),HU & KAM: RAMSEY POLICY UNDER STICKY PRICES AND LIQUID BONDS 13
so that Rt = R∗
t for almost all sample paths. More interestingly, when φ 6= 0, the steady-state or
mean spread R∗ − R is higher under sticky prices (SP) than under ﬂexible prices (FP). Also, gross
inﬂation is higher under SP than FP. Labor income tax rate is almost identical across FP and SP.
An intuition for these steady state results is that under SP, the planner can use inﬂation as a tax on
monopolistically competitive proﬁts. As shown by Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004a) the most costly
it is to change prices, the more, in their case, is the inﬂation rate closer zero, so that the nominal
interest rate deviates more from the Friedman rule of zero nominal interest.8 In our case, we have
normalized the steady-state inﬂation rate to 4.2 per cent per annum to be consistent with post-war
US data. So the analogous result we have is that in the SP economy the planner pushes the inﬂation
rate to its “zero” at 4.2 per cent, compared to the more deﬂated level of 1.7 per cent in the FP
economy. There is also a larger tax on liquidity as measured by both R and R∗ when moving from
FP to SP. This is our equivalent of the increased deviations from the Friedman rule when moving
from FP to SP.
We show this further in Figure 1(a) where we plot the results of the asymptotic unconditional
mean of the key variables over different values for the degree of price stickiness, θ. (We leave a
similar analysis on business-cycle properties to Section 6.2 later.) The difference here is we focus
only on sticky price economies. It can be seen that as θ increases, the interest-rate spread rises.
Inﬂation tax increases toward its steady state, while government bond holdings and income tax rate
τ falls with θ. As prices become more sticky, the planner is more concerned about the resource cost
of inﬂation deviation. The monetary policy aspect of the planner’s policy involves further deviation
from the Friedman rule by increasing R∗. However, the ﬁscal policy aspect of the optimal Ramsey
plan involves lowering R relatively to R∗ so as to create a larger spread in R∗ − R and thereby
altering the level of liquid bond holdings. As suggested earlier in Section 5, this only distorts the
distribution of liquidity holdings between money and government bonds, but by lowering the level
of government bonds the planner can adjust its sequence of implementability constraints (24) by
lowering average income tax and instead increasing the tax on liquidity services.
The intuition for this is that increasing deviations from the Friedman rule is called for in order
to indirectly tax monopoly proﬁts, but this results in a larger tax on money. To offset this effect on
money holdings, the planner engineers a higher tax on liquidity holdings in terms of the government
bond, by increasing the spread in R∗−R, which on the demand side of the cash-only goods market,
is also used to purchase cash consumption goods.9 Also the planner must deliver a lower tax on labor
so that there is more production of the consumption good. Thus, the optimal plan causes the quantity
of liquid government bonds to fall and money holdings to rise (Figure 1(b)). With increasing spread
in R∗ −R, households shift from holding government bonds to holding more money for purchasing
within-period cash consumption goods.
8A peculiarity of the Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004a) model is that their cost of inﬂation which enters their Phillips
curve assumes a zero inﬂation rate steady state, whereas in their quantitative exercise, steady state gross inﬂation is
calibrated to 1.042 or a steady-state inﬂation rate of 4.2 per cent. This is what we also use, but to be consistent in the
model we have normalized our inﬂation cost function (4) such that Π = 1.042.
9Recall we do not further distinguish between cash and credit goods, following Canzoneri and Diba (2005).14 ANU WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS NO. 472
Business-cycle tax properties: Table 2 also reports the volatility (second panel) and persistence
(bottom panel) properties of the four comparative economies. It can be seen that the Ramsey optimal
policy involves relatively less volatile inﬂation when there is a sticky-price cost to inﬂation (SP and
SP*) compared to when inﬂation volatility is costless (FP and FP*). In the ﬂexible price economy
(FP) without the interest-rate spread, the planner uses ex post inﬂation volatility to induce greater
variability of ex post real return on government debt so that government debt act as a shock absorber
in order to maintain smoother taxes across-states (volatility) and dates (persistence). This becomes
less vital when there exists bond liquidity (FP*) so that labor tax rate and inﬂation volatilities are
lower relative to FP, since now an optimal Ramsey plan can induce state-contingent real debt ex post
via the tax on bond liquidity, as measure by R∗ relative to R. This channel becomes more important
where there is a sticky-price constraint exerting cost on the planner to use inﬂation to make ex post
real debt state contingent. Thus one can observe in both SP* and SP, there is even less volatility
induced in labor income tax or inﬂation as the planner uses the interest-rate spread instead to satisfy
the implementability constraints in the optimal policies.
A similar intertemporal smoothing idea can be seen in the autocorrelation coefﬁcients across
the four economies. Tax on labor generally stays highly persistent, whereas inﬂation becomes less
persistent, but the interest spread becomes more persistent.
6.2 Business-cycle properties under price stickiness
In this second part of the numerical exercise, we consider in more detail how the existence of
liquid government bonds alter the Ramsey plan in sticky-price environments, in terms of across-
state and across-date allocations. These two features are summarized by volatility (in percentage
standard deviations) and persistence (ﬁrst-order autocorrelations) statistics of the key tax instrument
variables.10 We ﬁx the parameter that determines bond liquidity at the baseline value of φ = 0.149,
and then consider a subset of increasingly sticky-price economies, as measured by θ.
Figure 2(a) plots the Monte Carlo simulated probability densities of standard deviation of the
tax instruments and Figure 2(b) plots the averages of the same statistics with their respective 90%
conﬁdence intervals, as a function of the degree of price stickiness, θ.11 In the face of shocks to
government spending and technology, optimal policy is geared towards greater price stability. It can
be seen that as θ rises from a near ﬂexible-price economy (θ ≈ 0) to a very sticky-price one (θ = 8),
the volatility of inﬂation, Π decreases. However, we also see a rise in the volatility of R relative to
R∗ (and therefore in the volatility of liquid bond, b). It can also be seen that labor income tax, τ,
becomes less volatile as θ increases.
In order to achieve lower inﬂation volatility since inﬂation is more costly as price stickiness rises,
the planner creates more volatility in the ex post real return on government debt and the government
debt itself. The greater volatility in the return on government debt and the debt itself means that the
10Additional results on other variables in the system are available on request.
11Each density function or each point on the graphs in the lower panel represents an averaged statistic, for an economy
indexed by θ, for Monte Carlo simulations of length T = 100 repeated for H = 1000 history paths. The sample histories
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planner can use debt as a shock absorber whilst minimizing the shock absorbing role of inﬂation or
labor income tax when ﬁnancing government spending. This result afﬁrms the intuition discussed in
Section 6.1.2. – labor income tax becomes less volatile as θ increases – in contrast with that of Siu
(2004) and Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004a) in the relevant parameter domain of θ. Speciﬁcally, Siu
(2004) showed that as price-stickiness increases the volatility of labor income tax rate rises because
the planner in that case forgoes minimizing labor tax volatility in favor of a lower inﬂation volatility.
Our result is different because government bonds are held by households partly to provide liquidity.
Thus, instead of distorting labor supply and hence output by increasing the volatility of labor tax
rate, the planner in our model chooses to distort the distribution of liquidity between government
bonds and money. Thus we see a greater volatility on R and b, while a lower volatility on τ as θ
rises.
Part of the optimal tax program involves intertemporal smoothing of taxes and therefore allocations.
Figure 3(a) plots the Monte Carlo simulated probability densities of the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation
of the tax instruments and Figure 3(b) plots the averages of the same statistics with their respective
90% conﬁdence intervals, as a function of the degree of price stickiness, θ. We can see that as θ
moves from a ﬂexible price economy to one which has a lot stickiness (θ = 8), labor income tax
rate, τ, becomes more persistent and the monetary policy aspect of the Ramsey policy, R∗ and the
return on liquid government debt, R are both quite persistent. The converse is true for inﬂation. In
order to minimize the costly effect of inﬂation when price stickiness increases, the optimal program
makes inﬂation less and less autocorrelated so that, in combination with less volatile inﬂation, the
cost of inﬂation is smaller.
Finally, Figure 4(a) plots the Monte Carlo simulated probability densities of the contemporaneous
correlation of the tax instruments with output, and Figure 4(b) plots the averages of the same statistics
with their respective 90% conﬁdence intervals, as a function of the degree of price stickiness, θ. A
negative correlation between R and y suggests that in good times the planner would like to partially
reduce its debt burden by lowering the return on government debt. This is equivalent to increasing
the tax rate on bond liquidity. Similarly, in good times, when y is high, the planner would like to
tax labor, τ, at a higher rate. Both these outcomes are consistent with a planner that aims to smooth
out tax distortions over time and across states.
In summary, we ﬁnd that the more sticky prices become, the optimal Ramsey plan favors more
price stability but the planner can also afford a less distortionary income tax. That is as price stickiness
increases, the less volatile and persistent is inﬂation and the less volatile is labor income tax, but
the more volatile and persistent is the interest rate on liquid bonds and the quantity of government
bonds. Also, the relative interest-rate spread volatility is increasing with the degree of price stickiness,
reﬂecting the increasing use of the tax on bond liquidity across states.
6.3 Robustness and the effect of bond liquidity
In this third exercise, we investigate the effect of the government bond liquidity on the optimal
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plan when both technology and government-spending shocks are present, and also serves as a check
on the sensitivity of our previous result in Section 6.2. We repeat the exercise of analyzing the
optimal policy under different price-stickiness environments, across different values of φ. Here we
will focus on the unconditional means and standard deviations of the tax instruments.
Figure 5 plots the volatility of the key variables as functions of a set of economies indexed by
(φ,θ), where each economy (as a point on the surfaces) is made to share the same set of histories
of stochastic technology and government spending shocks. Thus we can consider the effect on the
optimal volatility of our variables of interest as we vary the degree of price stickiness θ, for different
cases of φ.
We obtained the following results. First, with more price stickiness and given a particular degree
of bond-money substitutability, φ, there is a rise in the volatility of government bond return, R,
relative to the market-bond return, R∗, but a fall in the volatility of inﬂation and labor tax. In other
words, the government can use debt as a shock absorber in order to lower two kinds of social costs –
inﬂation cost which increases with price stickiness and labor distortion cost which increases with the
volatility of income tax. This again afﬁrms the result from Section 6.2 for various computationally
feasible values of φ.
Second, for each given price stickiness level, θ, the greater is φ the more the planner can afford to
reduce the uncertainty of inﬂation and labor tax rates while increasing the volatility of the interest
spread between market and bond returns. Intuitively, in an economy with greater liquidity effect
of government bonds (higher φ), the “cost” of using bond tax is lower relative to the cost of using
inﬂation tax and labor tax. This is because for equal opportunity cost of holding liquid bonds R∗−R,
a higher money-bond substitutability results in a larger demand for government bonds which means a




for all e φ > φ. This argument is shown
graphically in Figure 6. This effect is further enhanced by the planner allowing for a lower spread
on average, R∗ − R, as shown in Figure 7, as φ increases. Thus, with relatively greater holdings
of liquid government bonds as φ rises, the planner allows for more volatility on the bond rate – a
surprise interest-rate tax, given inﬂation tax is too costly – for a given degree of price stickiness.
6.4 Liquid bonds and individual shocks
In this last exercise, we break the analysis of the effect of φ down to individual shocks to technology
and government spending. This is shown by impulse response analysis. This allows one to study the
optimal Ramsey plan under sticky prices when liquid government bonds matter, and how it matters
in the faces of a supply-side or a demand-side shock.
In Figure 8 we consider a one-standard-deviation (σg = 0.023) positive shock to government
spending. In Figure 9 we consider a one-standard-deviation (σz = 0.03) shock to technology. We
keep the parameterization of the model as in the baseline case in Table 1 but vary φ. For example,
under the positive government spending shock, the optimal policy plan generates a persistent decline
in the interest spread, R∗ − R, in order to encourage more government bond holdings. Labor taxes
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holdings fall. With higher bond liquidity effect, φ, the path of inﬂation and labor tax are kept
remarkably similar to the case with near zero bond liquidity, while the optimal plan allows the
interest spread to adjust by larger amplitudes and thus using government bond holdings more as the
shock absorber. A similar effect can be seen in Figure 9 for the case of the technology shock.
As these impulse responses show, the effect of government bond liquidity, φ, serves to provide an
optimal surprise interest-rate tax avenue, while the optimal responses of inﬂation and labor income
tax are remarkably stable or unchanged across degrees of money-bond substitutability, φ.
7. CONCLUSION
We constructed a model where government bonds provide liquidity service, an idea that goes back
to the work of Tobin (1965) and Patinkin (1965) and supported by the observation that US Treasury
bills have a role in facilitating transactions.
We showed in the paper that when a government bond plays a dual role of providing liquidity as
well as a traditional function as a ﬁnancial asset, it alters the Ramsey optimal ﬁscal and monetary
policy equilibrium allocations. We found that in environments of increasing price stickiness inﬂation
becomes less volatile and less persistent and labor income tax is less volatile. However, both the
quantity of government debt and its return to the debt holder become more volatile and more
persistent. Further, the labor income tax rate remains very persistent, reﬂecting a tax-smoothing
outcome. Also, the interest-rate spread is increasing with the degree of price stickiness, reﬂecting
the increasing tax on bond liquidity. Thus, with increasing price-stickiness the Ramsey optimal
monetary policy is to stabilize inﬂation, foregoing the shock-absorbing role of inﬂation in creating
an ex post state-contingent government debt. The corresponding optimal ﬁscal policy is to minimize
labor income tax distortions, over time (tax smoothing) and across states (lower volatility). In return
for the gain in low inﬂation volatility and low intertemporal income tax distortions, the optimal
policy uses liquid government bonds as a means of shock absorption. We show that this result is
robust across feasible parameterizations of bond liquidity and also in the face of government spending
shocks and technology shocks.18 ANU WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS NO. 472
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
First show that the plans {ct,ht,Πt,mct,bt,R∗
t}
∞
t=0 satisfying Deﬁnition 1 also satisfy (18), (22a)-
(24). Use (7) to eliminate mt, (26) to eliminate Rt, and (13)-(14) to eliminate τt, from the real
government budget constraint (20). This yields (22a)-(22b) for t ≥ 0. Using (11), (10) and (12)





for all t and all states, and use this to eliminate λt
and λt+1 from (17) to yield (23). To show that the decentralized equilibrium satisﬁes the time-t
implementability constraint, for t,s ≥ 0, (19) can be written as




t+i−1 and Wt+s := Rt+s−1Bt+s−1 + Mt+s−1.
Thus we can write Bt+s = (Wt+s+1 − Mt+s)R−1
t+s. Substituting these deﬁnitions into (27), and







t+sWt+s+1−Dt+sWt+s = Dt+s (Pt+sgt+s − Pt+sτt+smct+szt+sht+s).










−Dt+s (Pt+sgt+s − Pt+sτt+smct+szt+sht+s)]
= EtDt+S+1Wt+S+1 + DtWt.













−(Pt+sgt+s − Pt+sτt+smct+szt+sht+s)] = Wt. (28)
Making use of (10) to ﬁnd R∗
tR∗
t+1 ···R∗





































, to eliminate Rt+s, λt, λt+s,
Mt+s/Pt+s, and using (18) to eliminate gt+s we can obtain (24).
Going backwards. Now show that {ct,ht,Πt,mct,bt,R∗
t}
∞
t=0 satisfying (18), (22a)-(24) can im-
plement the decentralized equilibrium in Deﬁnition 1. Suppose that the economy is determined by the
Ramsey plan satisfying (18), (22a)-(24). The planner can construct λt that satisﬁes (11), (10), (12),
and (13)-(14) and (7). From these and (22a) we can recover {τt,mt,gt} that satisfy (19). Given λtHU & KAM: RAMSEY POLICY UNDER STICKY PRICES AND LIQUID BONDS 19
and λt+1 we can recover (17) from (23). Further {Rt} can be recovered from (26) for given {bt,R∗
t}.
It remains to show that the decentralized equilibrium’s transversality condition will not be violated.























Since the time-t implementability constraint is satisﬁed in the Ramsey plan, the limit of the LHS
of (29) necessarily exists when S → ∞, and this limit is Wt/Pt such that the present value of
the government budget surpluses equals exactly the initial condition on government liabilities. This










(Rt+sBt+s + Mt+s) = 0
which is (21). 
APPENDIX B
THE RAMSEY DUAL PROBLEM FOR NUMERICAL COMPUTATIONS






U (ct,ht) + λc
t
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with the ﬁrst-order conditions for t ≥ 1,
Uc (ct,ht) + λc

























































































































































































































and the ﬁrst-order conditions for t = 0,
Uc (c0,h0) + λc





































































































































































































CALIBRATING φ AND δ






























































Given h and sg, we can solve for c from the resource constraint (18) at steady state. And Π,b,R
∗ are























given an estimate of R. Once all the required values are known, one can solve for δ from (30).
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(b) Liquid bond and real money balance.
Fig. 1. Unconditional means under increasing price stickiness environments.24 ANU WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS NO. 472
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(a) Simulated standard deviation probability densities as functions of θ.
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(b) Average for Monte Carlo simulation with 90% conﬁdence intervals.
Fig. 2. Tax instrument volatilities in percentage standard deviation under increasing price stickiness environments.HU & KAM: RAMSEY POLICY UNDER STICKY PRICES AND LIQUID BONDS 25
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(a) Simulated autocorrelation probability densities as functions of θ.
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(b) Average for Monte Carlo simulation with 90% conﬁdence intervals.
Fig. 3. Tax instrument autocorrelations under increasing price stickiness environments.26 ANU WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS NO. 472
















































(a) Simulated cross-correlation probability densities as functions of θ.
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(b) Average for Monte Carlo simulation with 90% conﬁdence intervals.




































































Fig. 5. Tax-instrument volatilities as functions of economies indexed by (φ,θ). Each point on the surfaces are generated












Fig. 6. Example with φ > e φ. For equal opportunity cost of holding government bonds, a higher φ, results in higher bond










































































Fig. 7. Tax-instrument unconditional means as functions of economies indexed by (φ,θ). Each point on the surfaces
are generated by the same set of histories of exogenous shocks. Averages of statistics for Monte Carlo simulation T =
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Fig. 8. Impulse response functions to one standard deviation (σg = 0.03) i.i.d. government spending shock in two
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Fig. 9. Impulse response functions to one standard deviation (σz = 0.023) i.i.d. technology shock in two economies with
different government bond liquidity, φ.